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Preemption of ERISA Pension Plan
Exemptions in the Aftermath of
Mackey v. Lanier Collections
Agency & Service, Inc.: A Glimmer
of Light at the End of the Tunnel
by David M. Landis and Jon E. Kane
I. Introduction
As the partner in charge of your firm's
bankruptcy and creditors' rights practice, you are consulted by a prominent
orthopaedic surgeon. Your client informs you that he has recently been
named as a defendant in two serious
medical malpractice actions and may be
substantially underinsured with respect
to such claims. Further, he tells you that
during the early 1980s he invested in a
number of tax shelter schemes in the
form of real estate limited partnerships
on which he has executed personal guaranties for several million dollars of indebtedness. You are aware that many of
these investments suffered Significant
depreciation during the past several
years due to a softening real estate
market. A few of the lenders holding the
loan guaranties have already informed
him that the loans are in default and that,
if the projects are foreclosed upon,
there will likely be substantial deficiencies which the lenders expect to collect
from him.
As have most of his colleagues, your
client has invested heavily (over
$2,000,000.00 in his case) in an ERISAqualified retirement plan.! He says that
some years ago he was advised (not,
thank, heavens, by your firm) that the
pension plan asset would be considered
exempt if, as he is fearful is now happening, claims or judgments based upon
medical malpractice suits or real estate
partnership loan guaranties caused him
to file a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code to discharge the debts.
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You then ask him to be seated as you
begin to explain the ramifications of a
1988 United States Supreme Court decision, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Service, Inc. 2 You watch the color
slowly disappear from his face as you
explain that the monies which he had so
prudently invested when he set up his
ERISA retirement plan in 1975 could be
taken away from him. If he should
become a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, you explain, the pension plan is
likely to be considered part of the bankruptcy estate and thus subject to distribution to assist in paying the claims of
his creditors.
The doctor is incredulous and protests that he knows from having attended
a seminar on pension planning some
years ago put on by the local medical
society that the plan is exempt under
the laws of your state. In fact, as you are
acutely aware, your state "opted out" of
the federal exemption scheme set forth
in 11 U.S.c. §522( d).3 This seemingly
makes immune to creditor claims "any
monies or other benefits payable from,
or any interest in, certain retirement
plans, such as those qualified under
§401(a), §403(a), §403(b), §408,
§414(d), or §414(e) of the United
. States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended."4
As your client sinks more deeply into
his chair, you explain that the Mackey
case to which you have alluded will
probably serve to invalidate the exemption statute. Mackey held that "state
laws which are specifically designed to
affect employee benefits plans are pre-

empted under § 514( a)" of ERISA, 29
U.S.c. §1144(a).s
You tell him that upon the filing of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in which
a claim for an exemption for his interest
in the retirement plan is made, the bankruptcy trustee will no doubt object to
the declared exemption. The trustee
will argue that the statute which purports to allow the exception is preempted by ERISA, and therefore he
should not be entitled to an exemption
for the assets held in the pension plan.
Your client's face goes from white to
red. He angrily states that ERISA, according to the seminar put on by the medical
society, was designed to protect pension plans from the very fate which you
are describing. How could it be construed as preempting a state law which
purports to have the identical intention,
i.e., protecting retirement plans from
interference by creditors of a plan participant?
His day only gets worse as you explain
the ruling in In re Hirsch,6 which eventually became the first district court ruling adopting the Mackey decision to
ERISA pension plan benefit exemptions
in bankruptcy. In Hirsch, the court
voided the Arizona statutory exemption
for ERISA-qualified pension plans7,
which is similar in substance to most
other state pension plan exemption statutes, and held that the debtor's interest
in such pension plans were not protected from the claims of bankruptcy
creditors.
The Mackey decision, you explain to
your now thoroughly exasperated client,

has served to create a windfall to the
bankruptcy estate by rendering ineffective the traditional state law ERISA pension plan benefit exemptions. As both
you and he know, many business professionals who may earn hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions of dollars per
year often set aside tens or sometimes
hundreds of thousands of dollars into
ERISA-qualified pension plans, assuming
that the funds will be exempt from
claims of bankruptcy creditors by virtue
of either the state or federal exemption
scheme. However, follOwing Mackey
and its progeny, most bankruptcy courts
have held that a debtor'S interests in
such pension plans are not protected
under the state law exemption statutes
from the reach of a bankruptcy trustee.
Those state statutes are deemed expressly preempted by ERISA, despite the
recognition that the state ERISA pension
plan exemption statutes may help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes of
protecting certain benefits from creditor execution. S Further, with the exception of a few recent decisions, most
courts have also held that there is no
applicable federal exemption from
property of the bankruptcy estate provided by ERISA.
At the conclusion of your analysis,
your client appears confused and distraught. He implores you to give him his
"bottom line," what he can expect; i.e.,
is there any possibility that his penSion
plan will not be taken from him by a
bankruptcy trustee? Under present case
law, the answer, is that the plan will
probably be deemed a bankruptcy estate
asset and thus subject to claims of creditors although a few recent cases may
provide a glimmer of hope.
The dicta in the Mackey decision
regarding the applicability of ERISA's
anti-aliention provision to state garnishment procedures was recently revisited
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund. 9 The Guidry Court
affirmatively declared that §206( d )( 1 )
of ERISAIO places explicit statutory restrictions on assignment or alienation of
pension benefits, creating an absolute
bar to garnishment of plan benefits,
unless some exception to the general
statutory plan is applicable.
Based upon the dicta in Mackey, as
clarified by the holding in Guidry concerning the anti-alienation provi-

sions of ERISA and the intention of Congress to create a federal exemption from
involuntary alienation of pension benefits by the adoption of §206( d)( 1) of
ERISA, some courts have recently concluded that §206( d)( 1 ) of ERISA serves
to create an available nonbankruptcy
exemption for ERISA pension plan benefits under 11 U.S.C §522(b)(2)(A).1l
However, at least one court has recognized §206( d)( 1) as creating a restriction on the transfer of ERISA plan benefits that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law as provided under
11 U.S.C §541(c)(2).12Thisarticlewill
discuss the status of the law regarding
state ERISA plan exemption statutes in
the aftermath oftheMackEo'decision, recent

case law developments interpreting the
Guidry decision as providing a separate
federal exemption for ERISA pension
plan benefits, and how the different
approaches taken by bankruptcy courts
to the ERISA pension plan benefit problem tend to further serve or negate the
congressional intent in enacting
§206(d) of ERISA, 29 US.C §1056(d).
II. Preemption of State Law:
ERISA Exemptions Under Mackey

In Mackey v. Lanier Collections
Agency & Service, Inc., I3 the Supreme
Court considered whether and to what
extent a Georgia statute l4 barring the
garnishment of funds or benefits of an
employee benefit plan or program which
was subject to ERISA was preempted by
§514(a)15 governing such plans. A collection agency obtained a money judgment against several pension plan participants and instituted an action in a
Georgia state court to garnish the plan
benefits. The plan participants asserted
that the Georgia statute, barring the
garnishment of"[ fjunds or benefits of ..
[an] employee benefit plan or program
subject to [ERISA]"16 exempted those
plan benefits from garnishment. The
trial court granted the garnishment
request, but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Georgia
statute barred garnishment. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the Georgia garnishment exemption relating to ERISA
employee welfare benefit plans was preempted and displaced by ERISA "'since
it purports to regulate garnishment of
ERISA funds and benefits, a matter spe-

cifically provided for' in the federal
scheme."I7
Due to conflicting decisions among
state and federal courts on the ERISA preemption issue, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the holding of the Georgia Supreme
Court. In affirming the judgment, the
Supreme Court examined the preemption issue as follows:
ERISA §514(a) pre-empts "any
and all state laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered
by the statute. 29US.C §1144(a).
We believe that under our precedents, Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1 is
such a state law.
The Georgia statute at issue here
expressly refers to - indeed, solely
applies to - ERISA employee benefit plans. "A law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to
such a plan." On several occasions
since our decision in Shaw [v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85
(1983)], we have reaffirmed this
rule, concluding that state laws
which make "reference to" ERISA
plans are laws that "relate to"
those plans within the meaning of
§514( a). In fact, we have virtually
taken it for granted that state laws
which are "specifically designed
to effect employee benefit plans"
are preempted under §514(a).ls
The Supreme Court also considered
the argument that the statute should not
be preempted by ERISA because it was
enacted by the Georgia legislature to
help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes, and as such was not in conflict
with ERISA In this regard, the Court
held as follows:
The possibility that § 18-4-22.1
was enacted by the Georgia legislature to help effectuate ERISA's
underlying purposes - the view
of the Georgia Court of Appeals
below, see 178 Ga. App., at 467,
343 S.E.2d, at 493 - is not enough
to save the state law from preemption. "The pre-emption provision [of§514(a)] ... displace[s] all
state laws that fall within its sphere,
even including state laws that are
consistent with ERISA's substan-
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tive requirements." ... Legislative
"good intentions" do not save a
state law within the broad preemptive scope of §5 14( a).
Consequently, adhering to our
precedents in this area, we hold
that Ga. Code Ann. §18-4-22.1,
which singles out ERISA employee
welfare benefit plans for different
treatment under state garnishment
procedures, is preempted under
§ 5 14( a). The state statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal
law's preemptive reach. 19
An overwhelming majority of bankruptcy courts have interpreted the
Mackey decision as a mandate to invalidate those state statutes which serve to
effectuate the underlying purposes of
ERISA by providing certain exemptions
from the reach of creditors and bankruptcy trustees for ERISA-qualifed pension plan benefits. 20 As expressly provided in ERISA, the primary policy of
ERISA is to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries from certain creditor
execution. 21 However, in order to create
a uniform pension law, §514(a) also
explicitly preempts "any and all state
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan" covered by ERISA.22 The Supreme
Court's interpretation §514(a) in
Mackey has served to create a windfall
to the bankruptcy estate by rendering
ineffective traditional state law ERISAqualfied pension plan benefit exemptions. This interpretation or such an
interpretation is clearly contrary to the
congressional intent expressed in ERISA
§2(b) to extend antialienation protection to certain ERISA pension plan benefits. 23

III. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
National Pension Fund: Mackey
Revisited
The Supreme Court revisited Mackey
in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 24 and, in so doing,
may have provided an avenue for relief
from the harsh effect of the Mackey
decision upon the interests of a bankruptcy debtor in an ERISA-qualified pension plan. At issue in Guidrywas whether
a labor union could impose a construc-

tive trust upon an employee's pension
benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan
in order to recover losses incurred by
the union resulting from the employee's
embezzlement of pension trust funds.
The employee, Guidry, pleaded guilty to
embezzling funds from a labor union in
violation of § 50 1( c) of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959. 25 Guidry then filed suit in
United States District Court against two
of the union pension plans after the plan
trustees asserted that he had forfeited
his rights to benefits under those plans
as a result of his criminal activity. The
labor union then intervened as a third
party and prior to trial stipulated with
Guidry to the entry of a money judgment
in its favor. 26

[TJ he primary policy
of ERISA is to protect
the interests of
participants in
employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries
from certain creditor
execution. "
ff

The district court rejected the contention that Guidry had forfeited his
rights to benefits as a result of his criminal activity, but ruled that a constructive
trust in favor of the union should be
imposed upon Guidry's pension benefits
until the judgment was satisfied. 27 Accordingly, the court held that a narrow
exception to the ERISA prohibition on
assignment or alienation of pension benefits under §206(d)(I) of ERISA was
appropriate where "the viability of a
union and the members' pension plans
was damaged by the knavery of a union
official. "28 The decision of the district
court was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which
concluded that §206( d)(1) did not
preclude the imposition of a constructive trust, and it was unlikely that Congress intended to ignore equitable principals by protecting plan beneficiaries

such as Guidry from the consequences
of their misconduct. 29
Because the various federal courts of
appeal had expressed differing views
concerning the availability of the exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that the remedy of a
constructive trust against Guidry's ERISA
plan was not available. In so doing, the
Court looked to its dicta in Mackey, in
which the Court previously held that,
although ERISA does not bar the garnishment of welfare (e.g., vacation) benefits, §206( d)( 1) does erect a general
bar to the garnishment of pension benefits from plans covered by the Act.30 In
analyzing the precise language in
Mackey, the Court stated as follows:
The view that the statutory restrictions on assignment or alienation of pension benefits apply
to garnishment is consistent with
applicable administrative regulations, with the relevant legislative
history, and with the view of other
federal courts. It is also consonant
with other statutory provisions designed to safeguard retirement income. We see no meaningful distinction between a writ of garnishment and the constructive
trust remedy imposed in this case.
That remedy is therefore prohibited by §206( d)(1) unless some
exception to the general statutory
ban is applicable. 31
In reaching this conclusion, the
Supreme Court expressed its views on
the congreSSional intent behind the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA
§206( d) as follows:
Section 206( d ) reflects a conside red congreSSional policy
choice, a decision to safeguard a
stream of income for pensioners
(and their dependents, who may
be, and usually are, blameless),
even if that decision prevents
others from securing relief for the
wrongs done them. If exceptions
to this policy are to be made, it is
for Congress to undertake that
task. 32
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that it was the clear intent of Congress
to create a federal exemption from involuntary alienation of pension benefits by
the adoption of ERISA §206( d).
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IV. General Issues Addressed by Claim
of Exemption for ERISA Plan
Benefits
When a trustee objects to a debtor's
claim of exemption for ERISA-qualified
pension plan benefits, there are two
general issues which will arise: first,
whether the debtor's interest in the plan
becomes property of the bankruptcy
estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code upon filing of the bankruptcy petition; and second, if the interest of the
debtor in an ERISA pension plan becomes property of the estate under §541,
whether the interest may be declared
exempt by the debtor from administration of the bankruptcy estate under
§522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Fur- .
ther, in attempting to declare the debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan exempt under §522(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, two additional issues
may arise: first, whether the debtor's
interest may be delcared exempt under
a state statutory exemption; and second,
whether the debtor's interest may be
declared exempt under applicable federal nonbankruptcy law as prescribed by
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
V. Treatment of Debtor's Interest in
ERISA Plan Under §541
The threshold question when a bankruptcy debtor claims an exemption for
his interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan is whether the debtor's plan
interests are property of the bankruptcy
estate pursuant to §541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under § 541 all property in
which a debtor has a legal or equitable
interest at the time of filing becomes
part of the bankruptcy estate. 33
Section 541 ( c)( 2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, however, grants an exception to
§ 541 (a)( 1) by providing that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under
this title."34 Accordingly, §541(c)(2)
prevents any such interest from being
included in the bankruptcy estate. 35
Courts have traditionally construed
§541(c)(2) as not including ERISAqualified pension plans, holding that "applicable non-bankruptcy law," as referenced in §541(c)(2), referred only to
state law concerning spendthrift trusts,
so that ERISA-qualifed pension plans
containing anti-alienation provisions

were excluded pursuant to §541( c)(2)
only if they were enforceable under
state spendthrift trust law. 36 Recently,
however, courts have begun to recognize that the anti-alienation provision
set forth in ERISA §206( d)(1) should
qualify as "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" for purposes of §541( c)(2).
In In re Moore, 37 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the
issue of whether the interests of several
debtors in an ERISA-qualified profit sharing and pension plan were property of
their bankruptcy estates under §541 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy
trustee filed suit seeking turnover ofthe
debtors' interests in the ERISA-qualified
plan. The plan administrator asserted
that the debtors' interests in the plan
were not subject to turnover because
they were protected by an enforceable
restriction on transfer under ERISA
which the Bankruptcy Code recognized
as dispositive "applicable non-bankruptcy law" for purposes of exclusion
from property of the bankruptcy estate
under §541 ( c)( 2). On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed
with the plan administrator and held
that the debtors' interests in the plan
were not property of their respective
bankruptcy estates due to the provisions
of §541 ( c)( 2), and therefore were not
subject to turnover to the trustee in
bankruptcy. 38
The court of appeals looked to the
meaning of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in §541( c)(2)
and rejected the notion that the term as
used in that statute was strictly limited
to state spendthrift trust law. 39 In support ofits holding, the court stated asfollows:
The trustee in bankruptcy's narrow interpretation of §541 ( c ) ( 2 )
cannot be squared with the section's broad language. "Applicable
nonbankruptcy law" means precisely what it says: all laws, state
and federal, under which a transfer
restriction is enforceable. Nothing
in the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" or in the remainder of
§ 541 (c)( 2) suggests that the
phrase refers exclusively to state
law, much less to state spendthrift
trust law.
In addition to violating the plain
language of§541(c)(2), the trustee's interpretation of "applicable

nonbankruptcy law" is not consistent with other uses of the identical phrase throughout the Bankruptcy Code. In numerous places
in the Bankruptcy Code, the term
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" is
used to refer to federal as well as
state law....
"[A] word is presumed to have
the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute." It is
incongruous to give the same
phrase in §541(c)(2) a narrower
construction than the identical
phrase in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code, particularly since the
disparate sections of the Bankruptcy Code were enacted together in a single comprehensive
statute. 40
In considering the congreSSional intent behind §541(c)(2) and the "applicable nonbankruptcy law" language,
the court stated:
"[ I] f Congress had intended
§541 ( c)( 2) to only apply to state
spendthrift trusts, the term 'spendthrift trust' would have appeared
in the statute, rather than the
phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy
law.'" The term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" suggests no limitation to state spendthrift trust
law, and we refuse to read such a
limitation into the statute. 41
Although the Moore court recognized
that several circuits had defined the
term" applicable nonbankruptcy law" in
§541 ( c)( 2) narrowly to refer only to
state spendthrift trust law,42 it rejected
those decisions because they were purportedly based upon the legislative history of §541(c)(2), which the court
deemed irrelevant because it found the
language of the statute on its face unambiguous:
An appeal to legislative history is
inappropriate here because the
language of §541( c)( 2) is clear.
"Legislative history is irrelevant to
the interpretation of an unambiguous statute." ... Congress enacted
§541(c)(2), not its accompanying legislative reports. We have no
authority to limit the scope of a
clear statutory term by recourse to
the views of a legislative subgroUp.43
ConSequently, the court concluded that
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"[ t ]he clarity of the statutory term ['applicable nonbankruptcy law' under
§541(c)(2)] is simply not clouded by
the legislative history,"44 such that the
anti -alienation provisions of §206( d )( 1)
of ERISA contain an enforceable transfer
restriction that would bring the statute
within the meaning of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" excluding
the plan benefits from the bankruptcy
estate pursuant to §541(c)(2).45
likewise, in In re Kincaid, 46 Judge
Fletcher, in a persuasive concurring
opinion, expressed his doubts about the
traditional ruling that the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under
§ 541 (c)( 2) referred solely to state
spendthrift trust law. In his concurrence, Judge Fletcher stated that the
debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified
pension plan was properly protected by
ERISA's restrictions on transfer from
the bankruptcy estate pursuant to
§541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Recognizing the reasoning of the fourth
circuit in Moore, he also exposed the
flaws in the legislative history approach
taken by numerous other circuits in
interpreting the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under §541(c)(2). In
addition, he acknowledged the congressional intent in establishing §206( d )( 1 )
of ERISA, as set forth in the applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
and accompanying Treasury Regulations,
and concluded as follows:
Further, both ERISA's purpose
and its statutory scheme indicate
that it properly constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law." ERISA
aims to ensure that "if a worker has
been promised a defined pension
benefit upon retirement - and if
he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a
vested benefit - he actually will
receive it." To attain this goal, statutes and regulations restrict the
assignment and alienation of benefits. ERISA provisions therefore
seek to prevent alienation of benefits, either voluntarily or involuntarily. As such, ERISA falls within
the plain meaning of the term
"applicable nonbankruptcy law. "47
These recent opinions reflect the congressional intent set forth in ERISA §2(b )
(further buttressed by the holdings in
Guidry and Mackey) that §206(d)(I)

erects a general bar to the garnishment
of pension plans covered by the Act.48
Unlike prior court decisions which
ignore the anti-alienation provisions of
§206( d)( 1 ) on the basis of some vague
and inconclusive legislative history
regarding the statute, the recognition of
§206( d)( 1) as a restriction on alienation qualifying as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under §541(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code serves to further the
congressional intent of ERISA. It is also
consonant with the strong view expressed by the Supreme Court that, in its
opinion, it was the intention of Congress
to create a federal exemption from involuntary alienation of pension benefits by
the adoption of ERISA §206(d).49

"It would appear . .. that any state
ERISA pension plan
exemption statute would be deemed
preempted by ERISA . ... "

VI. Exemption of ERISA Plan Pursuant
to State Exemption
Provided the debtor's interest in an
ERISA-qualified pension plan is determined to be property of the estate under
§541 ofthe Bankruptcy Code, the next
question is whether the debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan
may be declared exempt under the pertinent state statutory exemption. In this
regard, the overwhelming majority of
bankruptcy courts have concluded that
the various state exemption laws have
been preempted by §514( a) of ERISA to
the extent they apply to ERISA-qualifed
employee pension benefit plans.. 50 The
courts have relied upon the Mackey
decision which concluded that the preemption provision of § 514( a) of ERISA
displaces all state laws that fall within its
sphere, even including those state laws
that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements, and that the state law
will relate to an employee benefit plan,
under ERISA, if it has connection with or
reference to such a plan. 51
Many state ERISA plan exemption statutes have not yet been the subject of
published bankruptcy court opinions on
the ERISA preemption issue. 52 It would
appear, however, in light of the clear
ruling in Mackey regarding the preemp-

tive scope of §514( a) of ERISA, that any
state ERISA pension plan exemption statute would be deemed preempted by
ERISA and thus rendered ineffective for
purposes of exemption in bankruptcy.
VII. Exemption of ERISA Plan Benefits
Under §522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code
The next issue to be addressed, assuming the debtor's interest in an ERISAqualified pension plan is considered to
be property of the estate under §541, is
whether the anti-alienation provisions
of ERISA, set forth at §206( d)( 1), serve
to create a federal nonbankruptcy exemption from property of the bankruptcy
estate under §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. While most courts that
considered the issue prior to Guidry
held that Congress did not intend to
allow a nonbankruptcy federal exemption for ERISA plans under that statute,
in light of the Guidry holding, some
courts recently have interpreted
§206( d)( 1) of ERISA as providing a nonbankruptcy federal exemption pursuant
to §522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
A. Analysis of §522(b)(2)(A)
Exemption Prior to Guidry
1. Majority Analysis -

No
Exemption for ERISA Plans
Under §522 (b)(2)(A)
Under §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, debtors in those states that
have opted out of the federal bankruptcy
exemption shceme 53 would still be entitled to an exemption for their interests
in ERISA plans provided such an interest
is characterized as a federal nonbankrnptcy exemption. 54 In this regard, the
vast majority of courts have traditionally
interpreted the anti-alienation provisions
of §206( d)( 1) so as not to create a
separate federal nonbankruptcy exemption and, in support of this contention,
have relied upon an interpretation of the
respective legislative histories of the
anti-alienation provisiOns of ERISA and
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Based upon the legislative history of
§206(d) of ERISA and §522(b)(2)(A)
of the Bankruptcy Code, until recently,
nearly every court that has considered
the issue has held that Congress did not
intend to allow a federal nonbankruptcy
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exemption for ERISA plans under
§522(b )(2 )(A).55
For example, in In re Licbstrahl,56 the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
whether a debtor's interest in an ERISAqualified pension plan could be exempted out of the bankruptcy estate pursuanuo §522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code as "any property that is exempt
under federal law, other than subsection
( d) of this section." Because Florida had
opted out of the federal exemption
scheme pursuant to §522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded
that the debtor's interest could only be
exempted if the ERISA-qualifed pension
plan fell within the sphere of
§522(b)(2)(A) as federal nonbankruptcy law. In looking at whether Congress intended to exempt ERISA-qualifed
pension plans under §522(b )(2)(A) as
an applicable federal nonbankruptcy law
exemption, the court referred to the appropriate House and Senate reports
which provided a list of property that
could be exempted under that section.
Accordingly the Court noted that ERISAqualified pension plans were not included. Although the court recognized
that Congress may not have intended
that list to be exhaustive, it stated that
Congress' failure to include ERISA within
the list was nonetheless indicative of
congressional intent because Congress
was aware of the existence of the ERISA
statute when it issued the House and
Senate reports on §522(b)(2)(A) in
1977 and 1978, but did not choose to
include ERISA in those reports. 57 Further,
when the Licbstrabl court compared
the ERISA anti-alienation provisions to
the list of property that could be exempted under federal law as set forth in the
House and Senate reports, the court
noted that, unlike the ERISA pension
plan anti-alienation provision, the other
property exemptions were "peculiarly
federal" in nature, so that Congress
might have intended to exclude ERISA
from the federal nonbankruptcy exemptions of §522(b )(2)(A) on those
grounds as well. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the failure to mention
ERISA in connection with §522(b)
(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code was
intentional, so that the ERISA antialienation provision, §206( d), would
not be available to the debtor as a federal

nonbankruptcy exemption under that
statute. 58
2. Komet Analysis - ERISA
Plan as Federal Nonbankruptcy Law Exemption
Under §522(b)(2)(A)
Prior to the Supreme Court's holding
in Guidry, a few bankruptcy courts disagreed with the analysis of the Eleventh
Circuit in Licbstrahl. For example, in In
re Komer, 59 the court, despite the Fifth
Circuit'S decision in In re GofJ,60 and
other authority to the contrary, concluded that the ERISA anti-alienation
provision was in fact a federal nonbankruptcy exemption available under
§522(b )(2)(A) to debtors in (1) those
states that had opted out of the federal
exemption scheme pursuant to §522( d),
and ( 2) those states that did not choose
to opt out of the federal exemption
scheme but opted to use the applicable
statutory exemptions rather than the
alternative federal scheme set forth in
that section. In so doing, the court
rejected the "strong dicta to the contrary" in Goff,61 and challenged that
decision on four separate grounds. First,
the court said Goff erroneously concluded that the only function of the antialienation language in §206( d)( 1) of
ERISA is to qualify plans for favorable tax
treatment. 62 Instead, said the court, the
threat of losing tax benefits was merely
an effective means to induce voluntary
compliance with ERISA's labor regulations and to enforce the equitable requirements imposed by Part I of ERISA. 63
Next, the Komet court rejected the
Goff court's interpretation of the congressional policy behind promulgating
Bankruptcy Code §522(b)(2)(A).
While the Goff court stated that the
Bankruptcy Code was generally intended
to broaden the "property of the estate"
available to bankruptcy creditors, and
was specifically intended to limit any
exemption ofpensionfunds,64 the Komet
court stated that "the structure and
development of the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code belie this
conclusion."65 The court argued that
Goffimproperly assumed that an intention to bring as much property as possible into the estate also assumed the
intention to limit the exempt property
which could be removed from the estate;
instead, §541 and §522 serve two very

discrete purposes which coexist quite
comfortably without conflict.66 In enacting §541 of the Bankruptcy Code, said
Komer, Congress chose to depart from a
scheme which had previously relied
heavily upon state law to define estate
property with the simple intent to
achieve national uniformity and broad
jurisdiction for the Bankruptcy Court
consistent with the expanded powers
conferred on the court by the new
Code. 67 In connection therewith, Congress enacted §522(b) with the intent
to reflect a policy generally favoring
debtors retaining their retirement benefits. The legislative history of §522(b)
clearly reflects a congressional intent to
accord the debtors sufficient property
to effectuate a fresh start, "with nary a
hint of an intent to penalize debtors for
chosing one exemption scheme over
the other."68 Consequently, "[A]s
§522(b )( 2)( A) contemplates honoring
existing exemptions available under
'other federal law,' the holding in Commercial Mortgage [Insurance Inc. v.
Citizens National Bank, 526 F. Supp.
510 (N.D. Tex. 1981)] representing as
it does a statement of federal common
law construing ERISA §206( d)( 1) as an
exemption, compels this court to honor
as exempt the benefits accruing from
ERISA-regulated plans which are in compliance with ERISA §206( d)( 1 )."89
Third, the Komet court rejected Goffs
legislative history argument of Bankruptcy Code §522(b )(2)(A), which relies upon the "illustrative list" set forth
in the House and Senate reports to support its conclusion that the Code section reference to other "applicable federal law" was not intended to cover
§206(d)(1) of ERISA. Rather, upon a
detailed examination of the legislative
history of §522(b)(2)(A), the court
concluded, had Congress intended to
depart from prior law exempting ERISA
plan benefits in the bankruptcy context,
it would have done so by choosing
explicit statutory language: "[I]t is dangerous to rely upon illustrative lists in
the legislative history to add such a limitation to the statute. "70 Also, the Komet
court recognized that, in taking the
legislative history approach, "Goff
breaks a cardinal rule of statutory construction when it relies so heavily on the
listing in the legislative history to sup-
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port its conclusion that Congress did
not intend to include ERISA plans under
the 'other federal law' rubric," in that,
where the meaning of the statute is clear
on its face, it is improper to resort to
legislative history to interpret the
statute. 71
Lastly, the Komet court rejected Goffs
conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code
was overruled by ERISA, and instead
stated that the proper analysis when two
federal statutes conflict is to determine
whether the two statutes can be construed so as to avoid any conflict. If such
a way cannot be found, then the conflict
should be resolved in such a way as to
serve the congressional intent impressed
upon both statutes and do the least
damage to either one.72 Accordingly, the
court concluded that §522(b)(2)(A)
permitted a debtor who had elected the
"state and other federal law" exemption
scheme to claim his or her ERISA pension benefit plan, to the extent provided
by §206(d) of ERISA, as exempt under
"other federal law" as provided by the
statute. 73
B. Analysis of §522(b)(2)(A)
Subsequent to GuidryAdoption of Komet Analysis
Due to the holding in Macktry, as clarified in Guidry, there have been an
increasing number of courts which have
supported the proposition set forth in
Kometthat §522(b )(2)(A) ofthe Bankruptcy Code provides an additional federal nonbankruptcy exemption for a
debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified
pension plan pursuant to the anti-alienation provisions of§206( d)( 1) of ERISA.
For example, in In re Starktry,74 the
court considered objections by Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 trustees to debtors'
claims of exemption of their interests in
pension plans qualified under ERISA,
and held that pension benefits could be
properly claimed by the debtors as
exempt under §522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code granting an exemption in any property that is exempt
under federal law. In Starktry the debtors were participants in a "401(k)"
ERISA-qualified benefit plan at their respective places of employment. In each
case, the debtors had made contributions to the plan, and benefits attributable to the debtors' and employers' (except as to one debtor) contributions
24 - The Law Forum/21.2

were accrued to the debtors' accounts. 75
Although the court recognized that the
status of ERISA plans in bankruptcy in
Colorado had been visited recently by
the judges of that court,76 those opinions
needed to be revisited in light of the
recent Supreme Court decision in
Guidry which touched, at least in dicta,
on the problems in interpreting the law
in that area. 77
The Starktry court began its analysis of
ERISA plans in bankruptcy with the provisions of §541(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and determined, in that area, no
law had been clearly developed to establish that ERISA was not considered
"other applicable nonbankruptcy law"
for purposes of §541(c)(2). Further,
the debtors' pension plans were not
valid spendthrift trusts meriting exclusion from the bankruptcy estate under
§ 541 (c)( 2 ).78 Because the court concluded that the debtors' interests in the
plans constituted property of their respective estates under §541 of the Code,
the question then became whether some
or all of the interests could be claimed
to be exempt pursuant to the provisions
of §522(b)(2).79 The court first recognized that Colorado elected to opt out
of the federal exemption scheme pursuant to § 13-54-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, so that the right of the
debtors to claim an exemption in their
pension funds was governed by the provisions of§522(b)( 2) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The court then noted that, under
Macktry, as well as under a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in the District of Colorado, the relevant Colordo
state statutes, C.RS. § 13-54-104 and
§ 13-54.5-10 I, were preempted by ERISA
and were also an invalid and unconstitutional attempt by the state to create
a special bankruptcy exemption. 80
Therefore, the court's analysis of
.§ 5 2 2 (b)( 2) was restricted to
§522(b )(2)(A) and whether the debtors' interests in their respective ERISA
plans were property exempt under other
applicable federal nonbankruptcy law
for purposes ofthe statute. 81
In determining whether the provisions of ERISA §206( d ) constitute a
separate federal exemption for purposes
of §522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the court stated that, based upon
the Supreme Court's holding in Macktry,
the majority of courts throughout the

country have concluded that the antialienation prOvisions of ERISA do not
constitute such a separate federal
exemption.82 However, the court also
recognized the analysis set forth by the
Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of Texas in Komet and noted that
support for the conclusions reached by
that court can now be found in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Guidry. In
particular, the court looked to the
Macktry decision, as clarified by Guidry,
and noted that the dicta in Macktry
clearly stated that ERISA contains explicit anti-alienation language for pension benefits. ERISA, therefore, provides
a general bar to the alienation or assignment of benefits provided for by ERISA
pension benefit plans under §206( d)( 1 ),
rather than merely setting up guidelines
to qualify pension plans for tax exempt
treatment, as previously contended by
the Goffcourt. 83 With these statements
by the Macktry court in mind, the court
next looked to the Guidry decision
which revisited Macktry and stated that
the statutory restrictions on assignment
or alienation of pension benefits established by §206( d) of ERISA provide a
bar to the alienation or garnishment of
ERISA plan benefits, and that such a view
is consistent with the applicable administrative regulations, relevant legislative
history, and views of other federal
courtS.84
Based upon a review of the dicta in
Macktry and the holding in Guidry, the
court set forth its opinion as follows:
Considering the dicta in
Macktry, the holding in Guidry,
and the strong view expressed by
the Supreme Court that, in its
opinion, it was the intention of
Congress to create a federal
exemption from involuntary alienation of pension benefits by the
adoption of 29 U.S.c. §1056(d)
(2), this Court concludes that
ERISA must be considered to be
another federal exemption for purposesof11 U.S.c. §522(b )(2)(A).
Thus, the ERISA pension benefits
of these debtors can properly be
claimed by them to be exempt
pursuant to those provisions. The
conclusion reached by the Court
is consistent with the legislative
history and properly harmonizes

otherwise potentially conflicting
results. 85
As to the legislative history, the court
reviewed the committee notes on the
provisions of §522(b)(2), which set
forth the list of some items that may be
exempted under other federal law for
purposes of that section, and concluded
the failure of Congress to include the
ERISA anti-alienation provision on a
clearly non-exclusive, illustrative list, is
not probative of an intent to exclude it
from that list. If Congress had desired to
limit §522(b )(2)(A) to only certain
federal laws, it would have done so by
incorporating the list into the statute
and making it exclusive rather than
merely illustrative. 86 Further, in reconciling the provisions of § 54 1 (property
of the estate) and §522(b)(2) (exemptions), the court set forth its analysis as
follows:
As to harmonizing potentially
conflicting or disparate provisions
of the Code, it is instructive to first
look to the results which would
occur in Colorado in the absence
of a bankruptcy filing. Because
ERISA preempts the state's garnishment statutes, immediately before filing of a bankruptcy case a
judgment creditor in this state
would not be able to garnish or
otherwise levy upon any ERISA
pension benefits of these Debtors.
By this Court's holding, the same
result will occur in bankruptcy.
However, if the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA are not recognized as being another federal
exemption for purposes of 11
U.S.c. §522(b )(2), in Colorado
(and in other opt-out states), a
debtor would have no exemption
at all in his bankruptcy case for
ERISA pension benefits, a result
clearly not to be countenanced
under the policy expressed in both
Mackey and Guidry. 87
Accordingly, the Starkey court concluded that the debtors were entitled to
the benefits of the exemptions provided
by §206( d) of ERISA by virture of
§522(b )(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Judgment was entered in favor of the
debtors finding that all benefits in their
respective ERISA-qualified plans which
had accrued as of the date the petitions
were filed were exempt pursuant to

§522(b )(2).88 This holding set forth by
the Starkey court reflects a small but
growing trend among bankruptcy courts
to allow an exemption for ERISA pension benefits as "any property that is
exempt under federal law" pursuant to
§522(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 89
VIII. Conclusion
In the aftermath of Mackey, numerous bankruptcy courts and circuit courts
have rendered decisions serving to void
state pension plan exemption statutes as
they "relate to" ERISA-qualified pension
plans. Additionally, a vast majority of
bankruptcy courts have also construed
the legislative history of the related stat·
utes so as to preclude finding either ( 1 )
ERISA is "applicable nonbankruptcy law"

rr

[IJ t would be prudent for
courts to affirmatively
declare that ERISAqualified pension plans
are included in the
r other federal law . .. HI

for purposes of exclusion from property
of the estate under §541(c)(2), or
§206( d) ( the anti -alienability provision)
creates an available federal exemption
for plan benefits under §522(b )(2)(A).
The result of this trend is that the state
and federal exemptions for ERISA pension plans, upon which professionals
have relied heavily to safeguard substantial assets from the reach of creditors,
have been effectively eliminated. This
elimination of ERISA pension plan exemptions in the aftermath of Mackey is
clearly in conflict with the strong view
expressed by the Supreme Court in
dicta in Mackey, and as clarified in
Guidry, that it was the intention of Congress to create a federal exemption from
involuntary alienation of pension benefits by the adoption of the anti -alienation
provisions set forth in ERISA §206( d).
Thus, in light of the dicta in Mackey,
as recently clarified by the holding in
Guidry, the current state of the law
regarding ERISA exemptions in bankruptcy needs to be altered in order to
more effectively reflect the intent of

Congress in promulgating §206( d) of
ERISA. Recently, certain decisions coming out of the bankruptcy and district
courts have recognized the congressional intent behind ERISA, and have
proposed means for interpreting the
potentially conflicting provisions of
ERISA §206(d) and §541 and §522(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code. The courts
have proposed two alternative solutions
to this problem: (1) interpreting
§ 541 ( c)( 2) of the Code as encompassing the anti-alienation provisions of
ERISA;90 or (2) providing debtors with
the right to claim an exemption for their
interests in- pension funds under the
provisions of §522(b)(2)(A) of the
Code. 91
Although a strong argument can be
made in favor of interpreting §541(c)
(2) as encompassing the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA, that argument may
be tainted by the fact that such a conclusion would render all ERISA benefits
excluded from property of the estate.
Thus, such an interpretation would
render ineffective §522(d)( 10)(E) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a
debtor to retain a limited interest in his
ERISA plan, as a federal exemption, to
the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor. 92
The better approach towards harmonizing the potentially conflicting provisionsof§206(d) of ERISA and §541 and
§522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is to
conclude that ERISA must be considered to be another federal exemption
for purposes of§522(b )(2)(A). By taking this approach, the courts will be
consistent with the congressional intent
recognized in Mackey and Guidry to
create a federal exemption from involuntary alienation of penSion benefits by
the adoption of ERISA §206( d), and will
still recognize the effect and congressional intent behind §541, §522
(b )(2), and §522( d)( 1O)(E) of the
Bankruptcy Code. In particular, treating
ERISA §206( d) as a federal exemption
for purposes of §522(b)(2)(A) of the
Code will resolve any conflict between
§541(c)(2) and §522( d)( 10)(E)while
still giving effect to both statutes under
the current interpretation of the majority of bankruptcy courts. Such an interpretation also resolves the potential
conflict under the current state of the
law in most bankruptcy courts where a
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debtor in a state that has not opted out
of the federal exemption scheme would
have a limited exemption for ERISA
benefits under §522(d)(1O)(E) available, but a debtor in a state that has
chosen to opt out of the federal scheme
would have no exemption at all because
he would be forced to attempt to utilize
the voided state exemption pursuant to
§522(b )( 2) ofthe Code.
Until there is either additionallegislation in the area of ERISA exemptions,
either on a state level (making ERISAqualified pension plans spendthrift trusts
under the applicable state law), or on a
federal level (providing for a specific
ERISA pension plan exemption in bankruptcy), or until the various United
States Circuit Courts or the United States
Supreme Court affirmatively determine
that ERISA-qualified pension plans qualify as "other federal law" for purposes of
the §522(b )(2)(A) bankruptcyexemption, uncertainty will continue to prevail.
Therefore, to resolve potential conflicts
in the area of ERISA exemptions in bankruptcy, it would be prudent for courts to
affirmatively declare that ERISA-qualified
pension plans are included in the "other
federal law" for purposes of the
§522(b)(2)(A) bankruptcy exemption
so that those conflicts which currently
exist between the related ERISA and
Bankruptcy Code provisions may finally
be put to rest.
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which is exempt from attachment and
execution under either state or federal
law, was preempted by ERISA to the
extent that it purported to allow debtors to exempt ERISA pension benefit
plans in bankruptcy); In re Majul, 119
Banke. 118 (Banke. W.O. Tex. 1990)
(holding that attempts by states to create
statutory exemptions for ERISA-qualified
pension plans are invalid as being preempted by the broad preemptive reach
of ERISA); In re Lee, 119 Banke. 833
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding Florida pension plan exemption statute preempted by ERISA); In re Martin, 119
Bankr. 297 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(holding Florida pension plan exemption statute preempted by ERISA); In re
McIntosh, 116 Banke. 277 (Banke. N.D.
Okla. 1990) (holding ERISA preempted
Oklahoma exemption laws applying to
ERISA-qualified employee benefit pension plans); In re Conroy, 110 Banke.
492 (Banke. D. Mont. 1990) (holding
Montana pension plan exemption statute preempted by ERISA); In re Burns,
108 Banke. 308 (Banke. W.O. Okla.
1989) (holding Oklahoma pension plan
exemption statute preempted by ERISA);
In reAlagna, 107 Banke. 301 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1989) (holding Colorado pension
plan exemption statute preempted by
ERISA).
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51See supra notes 13 through 19 and
accompanying text. It should be noted,
however, that a small minority of courts
have held that the state statutory exemption for ERISA-qualified pension and
profit sharing plans is not preempted by ERISA, and as such, under
those cases, certain ERISA-type plans
would be beyond the reach of a trustee
or creditors in bankruptcy. In re Vickers,
116 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1990);
In re Williams, 118 Banke. 812 (Banke.
N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Martinez, 107
Bankr. 378 (Banke. S.D. Fla. 1989);ln re
Seilkop, 107 Bankr. 776 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1989); In re Bryan, 106 Bankr. 749
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Volpe, 100
Bankr. 840 (Banke. W.O. Tex. 1989).
These cases hold that ERISA does not
preempt the applicble state statute because the state statute does not attempt
to regulate the terms and conditions of
ERISA plans, but merely provides an
exemption for profit sharing benefits
and pension plan money, which is an
area oflaw traditionally governed by the
state, and does not interfere with the
field of employee pension plans now
governed by federal law. In re Martinez,
107 Bankr. at 378. In other words, these
courts have held that the state ERISA
plan exemption statutes merely complement ERISA's purpose in seeking to
protect pension money from creditors,
and therefore, there is no need for ERISA
preemption absent a conflict between
the state and federal law. However, this
approach has been widely discounted
by the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy courts because it clearly disregards the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the preemptive language of
§514(a) of ERISA, as set forth
in Mackey, and the Supreme Court's
unequivocal statement that good legislative intentions are insufficient to save a
state statute from ERISA preemption.
52For example, there have been no published opinions from any of the bankruptcy courts in the State of Maryland
regarding § 11-504(h) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings article which provides, in pertinent part:
(h)Interestinretirementplan. ( 1) in addition to the exemption
provided in subsections (b) and
(f) of this section and any other
provisions of law, any money or
other assets payable to a partici-

pant or beneficiary from, or any
interest of any participant or beneficiary in, a retirement plan qualified under §401(a), §403(b),
§408, §414(d), or §414(e) of the
United States Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, or
§409 (as in effect prior to January 1984) of the United States
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, shall be exempt from
any and all claims of the creditors
of the beneficiary or participant ....
Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 11504(b) (1989).
In substance, the Maryland statute is
similar to §222.21(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, and nearly all other state statutes which provide exemptions for
ERISA-qualified pension plans. Therefore, it is likely that the state statutory
exemption provided in the Maryland
statute would be subject to preemption
by ERISA and, therefore, unavailable in
bankruptcy, much like virtually all other
state ERISA pension plan exemption statutes across the country.
53See supra note 3.
54See 11 US.C. §522(b)(2)(A), as set
forth supra note 11, which limits the
assertion of exemptions by debtors in
states that have opted out of the federal
scheme to: (1) the state exemption
scheme outlined in the applicable state
statutes; and (2) any federal or applicable state nonbankruptcy exemptions.
55See, e.g., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352,
1359-61 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied,
475 US. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl,
750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1985);
In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1274
(8th Cir. 1984); In re Goff, 706 F.2d
574, 581-86 (5th Cir. 1983); In re
Knowles, 123 Banke. 428,433 (Banke.
M.D. Fla. 1991); In f'e Rosenquist, 122
Banke. 775, 782 (Banke. M.D. Fla. 1991);
In re Morrow, 122 Banke. 151, 155
155 (Bankr.M.D. Fla 1990);In re Gaines,
121 Banke. 1015, 1019 (Banke. W.O.
Mo. 1990); In re Gardner, 118 Bankr.
860,864 (Banke. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re
McIntosh, 116 Banke. 277,280 (Banke.
N.D. Okla. 1990); In re Alagna, 107
Banke. 301, 314 (Banke. D. Colo. 1989);
In re Toner, 105 Banke. 978, 980 (Banke.
D. Colo. 1989); In re Dyke, 99 Banke.
343,347 (Banke. S.D. Tex. 1989);Inre
Brown, 95 Banke. 216, 219 (Banke. N.D.
Okla. 1989); Matter of O'Brien, 94

Bankr. 583,589 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988);
In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494, 497
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Ioe, 83
Bankr. 641, 646 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
56 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
57Id. at 1491 (citing In re Goff, 706F.2d
at 585, which contends that the only
function of the anti-alienation language
in ERISA is to qualify plans for favorable
tax treatment).
58Id. at 1491.SeealsolnreKnowles, 123
Bankr. 428 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991)
(relying on In re Iicbstrabl, 750 F.2d
1488 ( 11th Cir. 1985».
59 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989).
60 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
6lIn re Komet, 104 Bankr. at 805. The
dicta in Goff, 706 F.2d at 581-86, and its
supporting rationale was reaffirmed by
the Eleventh Circuit in In re Iicbstrabl,
750 F.2d 1448. See supra notes 56-58
and accompanying text.
62See In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 585 (stating
that "ERISA merely provides that as a
condition of obtaining qualified status
- with its attendant tax and other
benefits - a pension plan must preclude alienation or assignment of its
benefits." (Emphasis in original.)
63In re Komet, 104 Bankr. at 809. In
support of this contention, the Komet
court recognized that §501 of ERISA
serves to impose criminal liability on any
person who willfully violates Part I of
ERISA which includes the anti-alienation/ anti-assignment language of ERISA
§206( d)( 1), and further, that ERISA
§502 serves to impose civil liability for
the same offense. Id.
MIn re Goff, 706 F.2d at 587.
65In re Komel, 104 Bankr. at 809.
66.ld. at 810.
67Id.
68Id at 813.
7°Id. at 814 (citations omitted).
7 lId. See also In re Moore, 907 F.2d
1476; supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
72Id at 815-16.
73Id. at 816.
· 74 116Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
75Id. at 261.
76See e. g., In re Alagna, 107 Bankr. 301
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Toner, 105
Bankr. 978 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
77In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. at 261.
78Id. at 261-62. In this regard, the court
recognized that a strong argument could

be made in favor of interpreting
§541 ( c)( 2) as encompassing the antialienation provisions of ERISA, such that
all ERISA benefits would be excluded
from property of the estate under that
section. See, e.g., In re Moore, 907 F.2d
1476; supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text. However, such a conclusion would mean that all ERISA benefits
would be excluded from property of the
estate, and as a result, there would never
be a claim of exemption as to ERISA
benefits. This interpretation would be
contrary to §522(d)( lO)(E) which allows, as a federal exemption, a debtor to
retain at least a limited interest in taxadvantaged ERISA plans, as well as other
tax-advantaged pension plans, and would
render that statute moot. Therefore, the
Starkey court refused to read
§201(d)(I) of ERISA as being "other
applicable nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of § 541 ( c)( 2). In re Starkey, 116
Bankr. at 262 n.1.
79In re Starkey, 116 Bankr. at 262.
SOld. at 262-63 (citing Mackey, 486 U.S.
825; In re Mata, 115 Bankr. 288 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1990».
81Id. at 263.
82Id..
83Id. at 264 (citing Mackey, 486 U.S. at
835-39).
84Id. (citing Guidry, 110 S.Ct. at 685).
85Id. at 265.
86Id.
87Id. (citation omitted). In this regard,
the Starkey court recognized that this
conclusion is consistent as well in states
that have not elected to opt out of the
federal exemption scheme of §522(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code in which debtors can choose to either utilize the federal exemptions under §522(d) or the
exemptions provided under §522(b)
(2)( A). Should debtors elect the federal
exemptions, they would be permitted to
retain their benefits in an ERISA plan to
the extent necessary for the support of
the debtor pursuant to §522( d)( 10 )(E).
However, should they elect the benefits
of other federal exemptions and the
available state exemptions, pursuant to
§522(b)(2), then they would be permitted a full exemption for all of their
ERISA benefits. A contrary conclusion
would result in debtor's having available
in the non-opt-out states a limited
exemption for ERISA benefits under
§522(d)(1O)(E), but no exemption at

all should they elect to utilize the state
exemptions under §522(b )(2). Id. at
265-66.
88Id. at 266-67. In this regard, it is
worthwhile to note that the court, upon
review of the Fourth Circuit case of
Tenneco, Inc. v. First Virginia Bank of
Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688 ( 4th Cir. 1983)
(cited with approval in Guidry, 110
S.Ct. at 685 n.12), also held that the antialienation provisions of ERISA were not
limited to the benefits payable under the
plan from non-beneficiary contributions,
but instead extended to all benefits payable under the plan, including the contributions of the debtor to the plan. Id. at
266.
89See, e.g., In re Majul, 119 Bankr. 118
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990);InreMessing,
114 Bankr. 541 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1990); In re Felts, 114 Bankr. 131
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Burns,
108 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1989). See also In re Komet, 104 Bankr.
799, supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text. All of the cases cited herein
support the rationale set forth in Komet
and Starkey, 116 Bankr. 259, as buttressed by the recent Supreme Court
decisions of Mackey and Guidry.
90See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
9lSee supra notes 59-89 and accompanying text.
92See supra note 78.
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